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 Still, this book addresses a unique combination of major interlocking develop-
ments in recent molecular biology in a concise, informative, and refreshing manner. 
As such, it deserves the widest possible audience. 
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MANUEL GARCÍA-CARPINTERO & MAX KÖLBEL, eds. 2012.!The Continuum Companion 
to the Philosophy of Language. London: Continuum Publishing. 
The Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Language, edited by M. García-Carpintero 
(Universitat de Barcelona) and M. Kölbel (Universitat de Barcelona), aspires to offer 
an up-to-date introduction to several relevant areas of research in the philosophy of 
language. The book, therefore, does not intend to provide a detailed historical account 
of all the developments in the discipline, or an exhaustive exposition of its many sub-
fields—something that would lie far beyond the scope, and the space limitations, of 
this volume. The editors have chosen to concentrate instead on some central topics 
that are currently the object of intense study. 
    The contributors to this book are international leading experts in each of the areas 
covered. As a result, all of its chapters constitute an excellently informed and accurate 
presentation of the topic in question. Although original contributions to the debates 
only take place occasionally, most of the chapters manage to offer a high-level and in-
sightful overview of their subject area. Thus, this book will be of interest not only for 
newcomers, but also for those with previous knowledge in the field. On the contrary, 
it will perhaps be too advanced to serve as a basic manual for undergraduates. This 
companion is probably best suited for graduate students, and in general for research-
ers looking for an introduction to the contemporary landscape of the philosophy of 
language—or at least, to some of its main sights. 
     The editorial introduction, written by Garcia-Carpintero consists of a brief outlook 
of the historical background of the discipline, and of how the central issues emerging 
from such background have been projected to the more recent debates. The author 
himself acknowledges that his presentation is idiosyncratic: where the orthodox choice 
would be to start with Frege’s seminal contributions, Garcia-Carpintero prefers to fo-
cus on Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and the way it synthesises several Frege’s and Russell’s 
insights. From here, he extracts various fundamental questions that would have paved 
the way for the main future developments of the discipline. This historical perspective 
provides a sophisticated and unusual introduction to the themes treated along the 
book—although, of course, it is not the only possible historical approach.  
 The following chapter (by J. Higginbotham) is entitled ‘On the Nature of Lan-
guage: a Basic Exposition’. One might have expected a discussion of general features 
of language such as communication and signalling, but what we find instead is a com-
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pact, though rather accessible, linguistic account of the most abstract structural as-
pects of the syntax and semantics of human language. We may wonder whether these 
are really the most basic and fundamental aspects of the nature of language, but any-
way the formal training the reader gains is useful, because the next chapter—written 
by Josh Dever—goes on in a similar vein, dealing with ‘Formal Semantics’. Rather 
than attempting to deliver a systematic account of this highly technical field, Dever 
opts for presenting some representative examples of the problems and tools charac-
teristic of the area. It is to the credit of the author that the chapter is intelligible for the 
profane reader.         
 Gradually veering away from formal waters, the following chapter (‘Theories of 
Meaning and Truth Conditions’, by K. Glüer) is devoted to what could be called  
philosophical semantics, as opposed to formal semantics. Glüer examines the ques-
tions of what determines meaning and what form a formal semantics should take. In 
looking for answers, Glüer follows the guiding light of Davidson’s truth-conditional 
semantics. Other proposals—mainly Strawson's and Dummett´s—are only considered 
as critical challenges to Davidson’s model. Glüer concludes that, despite such critical 
responses, there is still hope for Davidson’s line of research. 
 The progression of the book goes on smoothly with two chapters covering the 
sematic revolution(s) that took place around the 1970’s with the work of Kripke, 
Donnellan, and Kaplan. The first one (‘Reference’ by G. Martí), discusses the seman-
tics of singular terms, while the second one (‘Intentional Contexts’, by M. Nelson) 
deals with contexts of ascription of propositional attitudes. At some points, the dis-
cussion is—inevitably—a bit compressed, and it is more likely to be fully appreciated 
by those already familiar with these topics. However, both chapters offer a good ac-
count of recent debates in the field, and they complement each other well. Moreover, 
Martí ends her chapter with an interesting section on the relevance of experimental 
philosophy for these questions.  
 The topic of the following chapter (‘Context Dependence’) is semantic context-
sensitivity. Its author, K. Bach explores different expressions as candidates for con-
text-sensitivity. Beyond the cases of paradigmatic automatic indexicals (‘I’, ‘Today’), 
more often than not Bach concludes that the role of the context is not to determine 
the semantic content of the expression, but rather to offer evidential clues that allow 
the audience to infer what is meant by the speaker. Bach also argues that many alleged 
instances of context-sensitivity are actually cases of semantic incompleteness: such 
sentences would fail to deliver a complete proposition. Bach’s discussion is thought 
provoking, if somewhat one-sided.  
 Context dependence dwells in the fuzzy borders between semantics and pragmat-
ics, so it is not surprising that the next chapter (‘Pragmatics’, by F. Recanati) deals with 
this last field. The area to cover is quite vast, and Recanati does the best he can to go 
through the most relevant matters. Besides presenting swiftly the main contributions 
of classic pragmatics (Austin, Grice, Stalnkaer), Recanati also revisites many of the is-
sues addressed in the previous chapter—although casting an interestingly complemen-
tary light on them.      
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     J. Zalabardo’s chapter (‘Semantic Normativity and Naturalism’) assesses the chal-
lenge that normativism about meaning poses to semantic naturalism. Among other is-
sues, Zalabardo examines whether truth is a norm for belief. The discussion is deep 
and suggestive—although the arguments analyzed and put forward by Zalabardo are 
subtle and involved, and may remain obscure for the non-initiated.  
 The last thematic chapter, ‘Analicity, Apriority, Modaly’—written by A. Casullo—, 
lies in the intersection between metaphysics, epistemology and semantics. As well as 
offering a modern view on traditional approaches to these matters (Kant, the Neo-
Positivists, Quine), Casullo considers more recent work by authors such as Putnam 
and Kripke—thereby providing a new perspective on issues discussed in previous 
chapters.  
    The book closes with a prospective chapter in which one of the editors, M. Kölbel, 
identifies some current, and future, trends of research in the philosophy of language. 
There is no telling what the future may bring, but it has to be said that Kölbel’s out-
look completely harmonizes with the sort of questions and approaches that have ap-
peared in the body of the book—for instance, Kölbel highlights the research on issues 
related to semantic contex-dependence.   
 This coherence is perhaps one of the main virtues of the book. Despite its multiple 
authorship and the wide range of topics examined, the different chapters link together 
almost seamlessly. Consequently, the book offers a consistent and unified view of the 
research within the philosophy of language. The downside of such unity of focus, of 
course, is the risk of disregarding alternative views. Although the contributors have 
done a good job of presenting competing positions, the book tends to gravitate 
around a particular approach to the philosophy of language. This would be an ap-
proach that follows the traditional order of explanation—from syntactics to semantics 
and, finally pragmatics—, and which tends to start by considering the more abstract or 
formal aspects of language, and then turn to its communicative and use-related fea-
tures (in this regard, it is telling that the chapter on formal semantics precedes the one 
on philosophical semantics, or that the introductory chapter to the nature of language 
is on formal linguistics). 
 Certainly, this is a relevant approach, maybe even the mainstream one, but there is 
no denying that there are also alternatives. If, as the editors suggest, this sort of view-
point stems from Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, a different line could perhaps be traced back 
to his Investigations. In such alternative approach—and in related ones—, the emphasis 
would be on language as a practice, as a form of human interaction. Many of this kind 
of views are mentioned in the book, but they usually occupy a somewhat peripheral 
position in the discussion. 
 On the other hand, even if many of the central areas of the contemporary philoso-
phy of language are present in the book, there are still some absences (just to mention 
a couple: figurative uses of language—particularly, metaphors—, argumentation    
theory or naturalistic accounts of meaning). I do not say this in a critical spirit: the  
philosophy of language is a very extended and polymorphic field, so the editors have 
done well in focusing their scope on a reasonably compact and coherent set of      
matters—instead of dispersing their efforts by trying to cover as much ground as   
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possible. The resulting book manages to present a compact, but highly informative 
and enlightening, overview of (many of) the most relevant topics in the modern phi-
losophy of language.                 
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JOSÉ L. ZALABARDO. 2012. Scepticism and Reliable Belief. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
This book presents a deep and detailed reliabilist account of knowledge that attempts 
to overcome the central sceptical arguments (the regress argument, arguments based 
on sceptical hypotheses and the problem of the criterion), which is worthwhile on its 
own. It is an extremely suggestive and dense analysis that surpasses the task of offer-
ing a theory of knowledge and goes deep into our metaphysical outlook. The book has 
this double aspect. Firstly, it tries to concede to the sceptic as much as possible, with 
the result that he proposes a change in our way of conceiving the goal of cognition, 
that is, a middle position between realism and anti-realism, in order to defuse the 
sceptical threat. But, secondly, although the motivation is anti-sceptical, the account of 
knowledge presented is, as the author himself asserts, “largely independent of how it 
affects the prospects of the sceptical arguments” (p. viii). 
   In Knowledge and its Limits, Timothy Williamson jolted the philosophical community 
with a series of striking claims that prima facie seemed quite hard to accept, but which 
were so compellingly argued that it proved very difficult to reject them. These claims 
included among them, that knowledge is not to be analysed in terms of belief and jus-
tification, but that it can be used to elucidate the latter concepts, and also that 
knowledge is a mental state. One has quite the same feeling regarding Zalabardo’s 
book. It is full of striking claims, but so well argued that it is difficult not to end up 
convinced of their truth, their initial implausibility notwithstanding. 
 Zalabardo argues for a reliabilist account of knowledge, according to which evi-
dence is not necessary for knowing. This allows us, on his view, to block those scepti-
cal lines of argument we have just referred to, since all of them rest on what he calls 
the evidential constraint, i.e. that knowledge requires adequate evidence. Particularly, he 
maintains that evidence is not necessary for non-inferential knowledge. It is fair to say 
at this point that the author conceives evidence in a propositional way: only proposi-
tions can be evidence. This may help to understand why non-inferential knowledge is 
possible without evidence. His account of knowledge is based on Nozick’s truth-
tracking account, but in a revised form (construed in terms of conditional probabili-
ties, instead of counterfactuals and possible worlds), and restricted to a kind of non-
inferential knowledge. So the claim is: it is not necessary for inferential knowledge to 
track the truth. But some qualifications are in order. Whereas Nozick’s truth tracking 
